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Philadelphia Orchestra Assn. v. Walt Disney Co.,
821 F.SupP. 341 (1993).
Introduction
The Philadelphia Orchestra Association sued Walt Disney Company claiming
entitlement to a share of the profits that resulted from the sales of a home video
release of the movie "Fantasia." The Orchestra performed most of the musical
score of Fantasia under a 1939 agreement between the Orchestra and Disney.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the Orchestra's
motion for summary judgment because there was an issue of fact as to whether
the term "feature picture" in the parties' 1939 agreement included home video
formats, and because the orchestra was not a joint author of the film.
Facts
In January of 1939, the Philadelphia Orchestra Association (the "Orchestra")
contracted with Walt Disney Company ("Disney") to record music for the feature
picture, Fantasia.' The Orchestra granted Disney the right to use the name 'The
Philadelphia Orchestra' on the screen and in publicizing the feature.' Disney
paid the Orchestra $2,500.00 for these rights.
In November of 1991, Disney released Fantasia in new home video formats -
videocassettes and laserdiscs. The home video version of Fantasia included the
Orchestra's 1939 performance, the likeness of the Orchestra, and the Orchestra's
name. Disney did not seek the Orchestra's permission to use its performance,
name or likeness in the home video release of Fantasia. Moreover, Disney never
paid any royalties to the Orchestra on the sales of the home video.
The Orchestra requested compensation for Disney's use of its performance,
name and likeness when the home videos were initially released. After Disney
refused, the Orchestra filed an action for damages and subsequently moved for
partial summary judgment.
Legal Analysis
The first issue before the district court was whether the term "feature picture"
in the 1939 agreement included home video formats. The Orchestra contended
I. Philadelphia Orchestra Assn. v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. Supp. 341, 343 (1993). The contract
stated that the Orchestra was to "furnish and grant" to Disney, "the right to use The Philadelphia
Orchestra" to record music "for a feature picture now in preparation for the Disney Studios." Id.
2. Id. The contract also provided that the Orchestra granted to Disney "the right ... in connec-'
tion with this feature, to use the name 'The Philadelphia Orchestra' on the screen and/or in all public-
ity of said feature." Id.
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that the 1939 agreement3 unambiguously granted Disney only the limited right to
use the Orchestra's name and performance in the theatrical exhibition of Fanta-
sia. The Orchestra further argued that the phrase "feature picture" clearly re-
ferred to a "feature-length theatrical motion picture intended to be exhibited in
theaters outside the home."4
The court held that the use of the word "feature" referred to films of a certain
length without regard to the medium or location in which they were presented.'
Moreover, it pointed out that the burden of clarity was on the party granting
rights, in this case, the Orchestra. The court therefore held that the use of the
term "feature picture" did not clearly exclude any media in which the complete
film could be presented. The motion for summary judgment was therefore denied
on this ground.
The second issue the court addressed was whether the 1939 agreement con-
templated home video technology. The Orchestra argued that the rights it granted
Disney in the 1939 agreement did not include home video formats because such
technology did not exist and was not in contemplation when that agreement was
formed. The Orchestra asked the court to take judicial notice of the fact that in
1939, no-one could have contemplated that feature length motion pictures would
be available for viewing outside theaters in videocassette and laser disc formats.
The court noted that a market for home viewing of movies existed prior to the
1930's and that motion pictures were available for sale or rental in a variety of
formats at that time. It also pointed to the fact that a precursor to today's home
video technology was under development as early as 1927. Given this evidence,
the court held that a jury easily may have concluded that home video technology
was contemplated at the time of the 1939 agreement. Therefore, summary judg-
ment could not be granted on this ground.
The third issue the court examined was whether the Orchestra and Disney
were joint authors of the film Fantasia. The court stated the general rule that
"'joint authors' automatically acquire an undivided ownership in the entire work.
The court also noted that there existed a presumption that one who commis-
sioned another to create a copyrightable work was considered to be the sole
author.6 If it could be shown that Disney commissioned the Orchestra to create
the music for Fantasia, then Disney would be presumed to be the sole author.
The parties therefore could not be joint authors.
The court articulated three factors commonly used to determine whether a
3. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
4. Philadelphia Orchestra, 821 F. Supp. at 345.
5. Id. The Court also noted that in United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 137 F.
Supp. 78, 80 (S.D. Cal. 1995), the court defined feature films to mean "sound motion picture photo-
plays, four or more reels in length." Moreover, the court pointed out that the phrases "feature film"
or "feature picture" have been used interchangeably to describe a television station or cable network's
programming libraries. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); National Cable
Television Ass'n, Inc. v. Broadcast Music. Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 638 (D.D.C. 1991).
6. Id. at 347-48 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1976)). The court pointed out that this statute
applied to the instant case because Fantasia was recorded prior to the effective date of the Copyright
Act of 1976. Id. at 348 n.7.
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work was commissioned. These were: (1) whether the work was produced at the
"instance and expense" of the commissioning party;7 (2) which party was the
primary motivator in the creation of the work;' and (3) whether the "commis-
sioning party" had the right to supervise and control the work, regardless of
whether such right was exercised.9
Applying this rule to the case at bar, the court first pointed to the fact that
Disney paid the Orchestra $2,500.00 for the use of the Orchestra to record Fanta-
sia. Additionally, Disney paid all consequential expenses of the recording includ-
ing the wages of the musicians, stage hands, and a music librarian. Therefore,
the court held that the recordings were done at the "instance and expense" of
Disney.
Next, the court noted that a 1939 agreement between Disney and the conduc-
tor of the Orchestra, Leopold Stokowski, specified that Stokowski would "use his
best efforts" to "obligate the [Orchestra] to do said recording." The contract
further required that all the music and recordings reasonably conform with
Disney's animation requirements, and meet with Disney's approval. The court
held that these facts indicated that Disney was the "motivating factor" and that
Disney "maintained control" of the Orchestra through Stokowski. The court held
that Disney commissioned the Orchestra and therefore was not a "joint author"
of Fantasia. Summary judgment could therefore not be granted on that basis.
The fourth issue before the court was whether Disney violated the Orchestra's
right of publicity by the use of its name and likeness in the home video release
of Fantasia. This contention differed from the ones preceding, as it addressed
only the name and likeness of the Orchestra, and not the performance of the
musicians who signed the 1939 agreement. The court stated that a defendant
violates a plaintiffs right of publicity by appropriating its valuable name or
likeness, without permission, to the defendant's commercial benefit."0 Moreover,
the name appropriated must have secondary meaning. The court stated that ordi-
nary words take on secondary meaning when a particular business uses them to
such an extent that they no longer register their literal meaning to the public, but
are instantly associated with that enterprise."
The court applied this rule to the present case and held that the name "The
Philadelphia Orchestra" had indeed attained such a secondary meaning because
of the Orchestra's publicity and longstanding reputation. Despite this, however,
the court held that there was still a material issue of fact as to whether the 1939
agreement between the Orchestra and Disney included the home video release of
Fantasia. Therefore, the court held that it could not grant summary judgment on
that ground.
7. Id. at 348 (citing Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567
(2d Cir. 1966).
8. Id. (citing Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972)).
9. Id. (citing Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys. Inc., 591 F. Supp. 726, 738 (N.D.
Ill. 1983)).
10. Id. at 349 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
11. Id. at 350 (citing Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 858 (3d Cir. 1992)).
1994]
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The final issue before the court was whether Disney wilfully violated the
Lanham Act 2 by misleading the public into believing that the Orchestra spon-
sored, licensed or consented to the manufacture, marketing and selling of the
home video formats of Fantasia. The Orchestra asserted that to establish liability
under the Lanham Act, it only had to show that it possessed a valuable property
interest in its trade name, and that Disney used that trade name in a manner
likely to confuse the public into believing that the home formats of Fantasia were
associated with the Orchestra.
The court held that although the Orchestra clearly had a protected property
interest in its trade name, it was not clear that Disney used that name in a con-
fusing manner violative of the Lanham Act. The court reasoned that this was
because the Orchestra did not establish that Disney represented that the Orchestra
endorsed the home video. Moreover, the court stated, Disney represented only
that the Orchestra's performance was contained in the home video. As the Or-
chestra cited no authority for the proposition that Disney violated the Lanham
Act by truthfully billing the Orchestra on the home video, and because there was
still an issue as to whether Disney's use of the Orchestra's name was authorized
by the 1939 agreement, the court declined to grant summary judgment on that
ground.
Conclusion
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the
Orchestra's motion for summary judgment. The court reached this conclusion
because there were still material issues of fact as to whether the term "feature
picture" in the parties' 1939 agreement included home video formats, and as to
whether home video formats were contemplated in 1939. Additionally, there
were also remaining issues of facts as to whether the Orchestra was a "joint
author" of the film, and whether Disney represented the Orchestra's trade name
in such a way as to violate the Lanham Act. Because of the outstanding factual
issues, the court denied the Orchestra's motion for summary judgment.
Eric Liebman
12. The Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any person who ... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device .... or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or mislead-
ing representation of fact, which ... is likely to cause confusion, or cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who be-
lieves that he or she is likely to be damaged by such an act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
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